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Abstract
Interactive constructivism and its implications for education will be introduced
in four steps. (1) The context of the approach and its relation to other constructivist developments will be discussed. (2) I will examine essential pragmatic criteria
in the tradition of John Dewey that are relevant for interactive constructivism.
(3) More decisively than Dewey interactive constructivism launches a meta-theoretical distinction between observers, participants, and agents. (4) Communication as a chief dimension of education can be analyzed out of three perspectives:
the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real. Educators must recognize that their
interaction with learners includes great demands not only in practical application/
implementation but also in theoretical reﬂection.

Contexts of Interactive Constructivism
The German school and university system is strongly content based. The ﬁxation
and standardization of subject matter (Bildung) has been at the center of German
discussions on education and schooling from the nineteenth century on. Traditionally in Germany this focus on the contents of learning has been accompanied
with an underestimation of the import of communication and lived relationships
(cf. Reich 2006). A tripartite school system was established to represent the necessary contents in different classes of students for different occupations after school.
For the elites this has been the Gymnasium, for the more technical occupations the
Realschule, and for the lower class of workers of all kinds the Volksschule, which
is now called Hauptschule. For those who drop out of the regular school system, a
Sonderschule was established and has today even become a regular part of the selection model. In times of the economical upswing after the Second World War,
the content-oriented school policy was functional in that it helped to give clear
orientation for the distribution of different graduates with different skills for different occupations. Social integration was mainly guaranteed by tradition and a
general conservatism. The German labor market seemed to conﬁrm the success
of the model. But in the last decades the transition into the more global markets
with higher levels of lifelong learning on one side and a high level of unemployment on the other, with more needs for communicative and social competences,
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with a decline of family traditions and values, and with high migration movements
entailed increasing failure of the German content-oriented model of schooling (cf.
Schnepf 2002).
The German content-centered model of schooling represented a type of
knowledge and discourse that was based on the idea of permanent, universal, and
unequivocal truth claims. In this model long-lasting curricula were practiced. Experience was largely restricted to its cognitive dimensions. Today, Germany suffers
from the growing contradictions between the effects of this traditional model and
the requirements of a changing, dynamic, pluralist, and post-traditional world.
These developments have largely been mirrored in philosophical discourses and the
social sciences of the last decades. They have been accompanied by challenges for
education and educational theories worldwide. The changed status of knowledge
in postmodernity has completely altered our understanding of learning and curricula. Approaches have come to the fore which emphasize the idea of constructing
knowledge instead of metaphysical notions about the fundaments of learning or
naive copy theories. More decidedly than before these newer approaches point to
the historical changes and developments of knowledge as well as to our responsibility to take into account the different versions of knowledge constructed in different
contexts of time and place. However, these insights are not completely new. There
are a lot of precursors for constructivist theories of learning and education. Figure
1 in the upper part lists some essential approaches that have had a main inﬂuence
on current constructivist approaches and gives an overview on the most inﬂuential
schools in Germany today.
From the side of philosophy, there is ﬁrst phenomenology which had a big
impact on constructivist thought e.g., through the work of Berger/Luckmann
(1966). Pragmatism was and is important for establishing theoretical foundations
for understanding the relation of acting and constructing. Different postmodern
discourses have sharpened our recognition of the import of deconstruction, especially in the context of post-structuralism (with regard to discourses), cultural
studies (with regard to cultures), feminism (with regard to gender). All of them
have not only been inﬂuential but show to a large extend an implicit social constructivism.1
Precursors in psychology are above all Jean Piaget and his constructive psychology. His work has especially been the starting point of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s
(1995) radical constructivism. But also Vygotsky comes to mind, who has been
much more inﬂuential in English-speaking communities. His signiﬁcance has
among others been elaborated and promoted by Jerome Bruner, who has had a major inﬂuence on constructivist-oriented theories of teaching and learning.2 Traditions of humanist psychology as represented by Erich Fromm, Carl Rogers, Ruth
Cohen and others have broadened the focus of psychological research to include
aspects of communication and interaction in culture and education. These are today very important ﬁelds of discussion in all social- and cultural-oriented brands
of constructivism. Family therapy sheds particular light on lived relationships and
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Figure 1. Constructivist sources and approaches in an overall view

networks of relations. In Germany more than in the English-speaking world this
had a direct impact on teaching and learning theories. Constructivist education
has developed methods of teaching informed by systemic concepts.
Since the 1960s cybernetics has been another major inﬂuence on the development of constructivist thought. Here Heinz von Foerster (1987, 1992) has to be
mentioned ﬁrst of all. Related developments have taken place in ﬁelds like biology
and neuroscience. The approach of Maturana and Varela (1978, 1988) was crucial
for the promotion of radical constructivism. The naturalism implied in this movement has been criticized by social constructivists. In the ﬁeld of sociology systems
theory has been further elaborated by Niklas Luhmann.
As to communication, the contribution of theories developed especially by
Bateson (2000, 2002), Watzlawick and others3 is of utmost importance. From the
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very start the development of these communication theories has been characterized by a strong tendency towards constructivism.
John Dewey’s pragmatism is considered by many observers today as the
most important precursor for social constructivism. His philosophy is important
for issues of foundation as well as for educational perspectives in constructivism.4
Unfortunately, in the German discussion up to this day the reception of Dewey’s
philosophy as well as his educational theories is still lagging behind. 5
The lower part of Figure 1 refers to the most important constructivist approaches in Germany. Methodological constructivism, as founded by Wilhelm
Kamlah and Paul Lorenzen, has partly been transformed into cultural theory.
This approach focuses on a critical reconstruction of the cultural genesis of socalled prototypes, i.e., basic scientiﬁc categories and methodologies as performed
in discursive activities. Thereby the dominant interest lies in the reconstruction
of means-ends-rationality. Starting from the perspective of applications, it tries to
analyze the presumptions according to which the sciences always proceed. Today,
Peter Janich is the main proponent of this approach in Germany.
Radical constructivism shows a highly subjectivist attitude. Its main advocates, Heinz von Foerster (e.g. 1992) and Ernst von Glasersfeld (e.g. 1995), have
stressed the subjective dimensions of constructing knowledge. They attempt to
consider individual constructions in all their diversity as different possibilities and
viabilities to cope with reality. However, insights from philosophical discussions
on postmodernity, and developments of critical thinking in twentieth-century
cultural theories are largely neglected in their works. In the background of this
approach is a discursive reﬂection on changes in the sciences, especially the emergence of cybernetics as well as developments in linguistics, cognitive psychology,
and biology. The works of Gregory Bateson, Humberto Maturana and Maturana/
Varela (1988) are most important in the development of this approach. Here the
subjectivist view is obvious.
The two arrows in the ﬁgure indicate that there has been a social and cultural
turn in constructivism in the last years. They point towards social constructivism
as a generic term for quite a number of different approaches. For example, versions
of social constructivism have been launched by Berger/Luckmann (1966), KnorrCetina (1981, 1999) and in the socio-psychological works of Gergen (e.g. 1991, 1994,
1999). Interactive constructivism is another example here.
The cultural turn today shows constructivism as a part of the complex discourses in the humanities. The Cologne approach of interactive constructivism
offers many reﬂections and instruments for creating perspectives on constructivist
education. By now the approach is well-known and practiced in German teacher
education and training.6 The approach is based on an extensive philosophical
background. Especially, it takes up threads indicated above like poststructuralism,
postmodernism, and cultural studies—e.g., in the works of Michel Foucault, JeanFrançois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, Stuart
Hall and others. In the ﬁeld of educational theory it draws on diverse approaches

E&C ♦ Education and Culture

Interactive Constructivism in Education ♦ 11
that ﬂow from a multimodal, multidimensional and multiparticipant understanding of learning processes (cf. e.g. Kress et al. 2005).7 It is an essential claim of the
approach not only to elaborate suggestions for practical instruction, but to reﬂect
on the broader cultural conditions and contexts of learning.
In this essay I will give a brief introduction to some crucial issues in the
program of interactive constructivism. Among these is ﬁrst the reference to John
Dewey because his works in many respects have laid foundations for the elaboration
of the approach. I will then discuss brieﬂy the three core perspectives of observer,
participant, and agent in interactive constructivism and indicate some differences
to Dewey. I will close by introducing three important perspectives on communication: the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real.

Pragmatist Criteria Are Still Relevant
for Interactive Constructivism
A pragmatic turn in education has been established particularly by John Dewey,
whose works can still give orientation to educational goals, methods, and practices as
well as theoretical reﬂections today. Experience, a term having strong connotations
of activity, is the basic pragmatic concept in Dewey. It indicates also the starting
point and aim of learning and gives us criteria of successful individual and social
learning processes. In a comprehensive view, such learning constitutes growth.
We learn by experience, by interactions, which enable us to learn things we can
use again in future actions. Thus, we grow in our active learning (experiencing)
and change our actions through learning (experienced). From the perspective of
interactive constructivism, several important criteria already implied in Dewey’s
work are particularly relevant for a constructivist interpretation of pragmatism. I
would like to summarize some of these criteria brieﬂy:
• Learning by doing: “Every educative process should begin with do-

ing something; and the necessary training of sense perception,
memory, imagination and judgment should grow out of the conditions and needs of what is being done” (MW 4, 185). In this
sense it is important for learners to have access to multimodal
ways of experiencing and to be able to use, expand, or change
the experienced in further experience. Therefore, growth should
be made the supreme principle of all learning. Mere learning for
learning’s sake is hostile to a pragmatic and constructive perspective.
• Context: Learning always takes place within a context, in an environment, and the most important aspect of a learning environment is the learners’ interactions. Such interactions take place between learners and other learners, between learners and teachers,
and between learners and subject matter. Learners need an environment which is open to the learner’s own actions, the discovery
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of problems and solutions from the learner’s point of view. Dewey’s concept of inquiry emphasized the importance of experimental environments. In this perspective, learning is always situational
and relational, involving what Dewey calls the positions of “spectator,” “participant,” and “agent” (cf. MW 9, 131). Although similar situations may lead different learners to similar solutions, each
learning situation is unique and its solution is speciﬁc (cf. LW 5,
127).
• Democracy in Education: Democracy in education has two powerful resources for learning: freedom and participation. On the one
hand, learners must be free to preserve and expand those spaces,
which enable them to go their own way. Teachers must not restrict
learning to an uncritical adaptation of knowledge but have to provide opportunities for individual inquiries, interpretations, and
judgments. This can only be accomplished if extensive participation is made possible. If democracy is just part of the syllabus
taught from outside, this will work against a lively interest in democracy.
• Interaction: Interactions challenge us to always take into account
the social background and effects whenever we teach and learn.
Since learning should aim at growth, we have to support all learners—especially those suffering from social disadvantages—and
increase their chances of learning and acting. For Dewey, communication within a supportive community of learning is the chief
instrument of democracy in education. Such communication does
not take place only on the level of contents or subject matter, but
always rests on lived relationships connected with everyday environments and cultural contexts of learning.

Education: Observers, Participants, and Agents
Taking these considerations into account, interactive constructivism brings the
distinction between three different perspectives in and on education to the fore
(cf. Reich 2003, 2007):
(1) As an observer, we focus all our senses on what surrounds us and what we are
thinking and doing in our experience. We take the position of a self-observer whenever we reﬂect on our own experience. And we take the position of a distant-observer
whenever we observe others and judge their actions and articulations. We also take
the position of a distant-observer whenever we try to transcend our habitual position of observing and look at ourselves critically from an imagined outside position.
Observers make observations. As shown in Figure 2, the observer is a position that
is always subjective. Each experience of observation has its singular moment. But
for interactive constructivism, observation is also always embedded in a cultural
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context. Therefore, constructivism cannot be mere subjectivism—an assumption
overemphasized by radical constructivism (cf. von Glasersfeld 1995)—but needs
perspectives on social and cultural interactions, as in Dewey. Observations are part
of an interpretive net of interconnected perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, claims, and
habits. Alternating between self- and distant-observing, the observer has some
freedom in his interpretations, but culture sets limits. In making use of this freedom, imaginations play a big role. Already Dewey knew that observations and their
symbolic articulations are driven by imagination. Observers construct from their
observations different versions of reality and “truths.” For constructivism, each
version of reality constitutes its own perspective, and a change of observing results
in a change of perspectives. But there is
no ultimate or best observer. Neither is
there, in the succession and juxtaposition of observations, a comprehensive
and complete knowledge of true observations for all times and circumstances.
We have to concede plurality and diversity, instead, although all observers at the same time are constrained by
cultural conventions. As members of a
particular culture, we observe within
the given context of this culture. In always being cultural participants as well
as observers, the freedom of our observations is limited.

Figure 2

Difﬁcult within this concept is the claim that we have to realize two perspectives in two steps. On the one hand we have to observe ourselves as if we could
look from the outside as an external observer. On the other hand we are always
looking from our inner position as a self-observer. My assertion is that we are able
to exceed the position of self-observing by interacting with others. The feedback
that we get in interactions may then be internalized and become a kind of inner
dialogue we lead with ourselves. In any case the tension between self- and distant-observing presupposes open-mindedness, self-criticism, tolerance of frustration and ambivalence. Dewey already knew that some individuals have special
abilities to empathize with others. They are particularly sensible and can imagine
the expectations and interests of others. But cultural change, with an increase of
pluralism, diversity, cultural and migration differences, entails the necessity to
educate and nurture this sensitivity for all observers. In social communication
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this competence has become so important that we have to spend a lot of time in
education to achieve it. Since the contents of learning are always embedded in
and communicated through lived relationships with others, relationships themselves have become a primary concern of education. At the same time the space
and liberty of interpretation has grown in our culture. The different versions of
reality constructions that are present in any communicative situation demand
social open-mindedness. We cannot rely on traditions or rituals the way other
generations did. In responding to unambiguity and ambivalence we must balance
out our more complex communication and an open attitude by changing in our
observations between the inner and outer views. Dewey had his focus mainly on
the role of the participant and the agent. For him the observer is rather a spectator than an active part of our communicative competences. Dewey emphasizes
the direct connection between observing and partaking. But in postmodernity
the split between observing and participation has grown, and it is even possible
to come to a contradictory use of the roles. The observer in our times has emancipated himself in many ways from his participations or actions: He may completely forget or ignore in which community of understanding he lives and what
norms, values, and ideas are important to him in judging his observations. The
greater diversity of possible (maybe only imagined) participations enables on the
one hand greater freedom of observation. On the other hand forgetfulness about
contexts of participation often prevents us from critical reﬂection. In the media,
e.g., in ﬁlm and television, we have established a big industry that provides us with
occasions for this forgetfulness. And this position is combined with inactivity
because we are captured by our observations and take them as actions. But they
are only rudimentary actions without the possibility to construct new versions of
reality that are created out of our own wishes and needs. Both the forgetfulness
and the inactivity have to be questioned: The forgetfulness of our participative
commitments and chances opens the door for all kinds of manipulations and
persuasions. The active observing position turns out to be inactivity in the lifeworld. But often we do not notice this inactivity and the reduction of our possible activities that it involves, because this kind of observation is combined with
entertainment and joy. To give us critical perspectives for reﬂecting the chances
and dangers of observing and the roles of observers, we must develop a theory
of the observer that examines the complex interrelations between observations,
participation and actions.
(2) We are participants in being members of a community (organized by chance
or institution) that shares particular ways of ﬁnding meanings and of communicating and thus provides contexts for observing and acting. As observers we seem
free, as participants (see Figure 3) we are always attached to numerous basic understandings that have long been ﬁxed and are conditions of participation—social
norms, values, conventions, and morals. Every participation is at the same time
a commitment—like being a feminist, a Christian, an atheist, a member of an
ethnic group, a member of a political party, a scientiﬁc, social, economic or other
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community with its particular interpretations, etc. Participation always involves
identity. But in postmodern times identity means identities (cf. e.g. Bauman 1997,
2000): a plurality of possible identiﬁcations out of overlapping, partial, ambivalent,
sometimes contradictory and also changing participations. These participations
may even result in a number of inconsistent combinations of commitments (one
may, for example, participate in ecological groups while at the same time driving a
car). Observation and participation are culturally interwoven. To reﬂect critically
on our experiences, we need to participate in communities of interpreters and/or
inquirers. Inquiry is a cultural instrument for solving problems (cf. LW 12), while
the understanding of problems and their solutions is always a cultural interpretation. In interactive constructivism, interpretive communities are embedded in
practices, routines, and institutions—cultural conditions of participation that are
often taken for granted in our observations. Therefore, it is decisive for a critical
observer theory to distinguish between these different perspectives and to take
their effect on our observations and participations into account.

Figure 3

Dewey already distinguishes sometimes between participants and other
roles. But he did not develop a systematic and sufﬁciently elaborated theory of
the relation between the complex and possibly even contradictory roles of observers and participants (cf. Reich 2007). In view of the role of participants, however,
Dewey gives us a rich account of the conditions and effects of communication in
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life-worlds. For him the participative role in human communication is decisive:
“Men associate in many ways. But the only form of association that is truly humane, and not a gregarious gathering for warmth and protection, or a mere device
for efﬁciency in outer action, is the participation in meanings and goods that is
effected by communication” (LW 10, 249). A positive communication for human
and social growth thus is an active participation in a community of democratic
practice. Dewey is aware of the fact that this democratic participation is often more
an ideal than reality, but this makes him even more determined to demand more
democracy. Democratic practices and institutions are embedded in historical process and here the chances of participation change. For Dewey the only solution to
further the process of democracy is to make the role of participation as large as
possible. This enlargement is especially crucial for education because in education
the above-mentioned criteria (experience, context, democracy, interaction) have
to be combined with a concept of participation. As educators and teachers we must
provide good examples in participative communities to give clear social models,
orientations, and ways of critical reﬂection. Every new generation that is educated
will establish its values in interaction with examples we give. If we are too forgetful
about partaking and focus only on observations then we cannot expect to be successful in the way of furthering democratic values and practices. This is a dilemma
of much content-centred teaching, where observations contained in curricula and
schoolbooks tempt learners to observe only superﬁcially and to learn reproductively
without developing competencies of partaking in shared inquiries.
In Richard Rorty’s version of pragmatism the risks of the role of participants
are reﬂected for our times. He concludes from a perspective of different versions
of realities as viewed in Western cultures, that there can be no solution, in the long
run, as to which explanation of desirable realities is more justiﬁed or effective than
others. Our partaking in democratic processes loses its clarity. There are no ﬁnal
reasons for choosing between different versions of better participation or wrong
ways of partaking. No meta-narrative, no theory of human nature, no metaphysics,
or even theology can establish an unambiguous foundation for the just community
and the right participation. Therefore we have to be critical vis-à-vis all our roles
of participation and our practices, routines, and institutions. Do we really achieve
as much participation as we need? Or is the critical reﬂection of our actual participation already destroyed by the dominance of observer roles that we take? The
performance of observing and constructing does not necessarily imply a general,
universal, and correct criterion for all claims of validity. Warranty is found in the
performances themselves in the context of the cultural and always ethnocentric interpretations of the ways we live (cf. Rorty 2000). But he is especially critical about
any preconception by philosophers of Dewey about the way we should live. Such
pre-decisions have shown their futility too many times to be convincing anymore.
Philosophers should keep their hands off people’s affairs and leave them alone (cf.
Rorty 1991, 194); they should care about tolerance rather than emancipation (ibid.,
213). In privacy one can cultivate the irony that is necessary for critical reﬂection.
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The aim of irony, for Rorty, is not arrogance but modesty. This position changes
our understanding of participation in education. Now it is the learners themselves
who must interpret the contexts they live in and decide about the kinds of participation they will and can take. But decisions are limited. Postmodern irony and
freedom is not appropriate for public matters like government and constitution,
for laws and justice, for liberties in political life. Here, at least the possibilities of
democratic participation on a larger scale have to be enabled. Education is one main
resource to gain habits that respect participation in groups and communities. For
Rorty, liberals must protect democratic political conditions to secure the possibility
of ironic self-reﬂection and the diversity of aesthetic lives. The point is to organize
private and public life in participative roles that support diversity and pluralism as
concrete choices of people with democratic orientations.
In postmodernity the contradiction between freedom and solidarity has
grown. As observers we enjoy, for example, the pluralism, diversity, heterogeneity,
and ambivalence of our observations. Here we can act very open and free. But as
participants in the ecstasies of such freedom we nevertheless need a frame of solidarity that provides sufﬁcient support in an economic, social, cultural, political or
other sense. This necessary solidarity of participants delimits Rorty’s liberalism.
To balance between our observer and participant roles in learning, we have to acknowledge that forgetfulness about the conditions of our participation in groups,
communities, and societies can be dangerous. Its puts at risk our own security as
well as the prosperity and democratic quality of the communities in which we participate. Therefore a democratic education has to cultivate critical reﬂection on the
balance between observing and partaking roles. The interrelation between these
roles should not develop arbitrarily. Rorty’s ironic position is helpful here because
it suggests a way of combining the roles without taking refuge in one-sided or
dogmatic views that stand in opposition to our current life-world. But irony is not
sufﬁcient for the necessary critical reﬂection. Here it seems fruitful to reconstruct
Dewey’s project of democratic education. This requires beyond irony the struggle
for more equity, social justice and political and communicative participation. This
is what critical educators all over the world experience day by day: their visions of
solidarity time and again have to face the threat of political or economical shortcomings. The must leave the position of an inner irony as well as the circle of a community of ironists if they are to participate more effectively in critical discourses
and actions. In comparison irony provides a more passive observer position. What
is needed is to penetrate more deeply into an understanding of the complex social
and cultural contexts of education and to participate in critical practice with a view
to further democratic contexts.
(3) As an agent, it often seems that we act without ﬁrst observing. Moreover we
sometimes seem to be able to act without participating. But this at best only applies to very spontaneous action. As reﬂection shows, the appearance in most cases
is due to our being forgetful about the contexts of our actions—and then others
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may reproach us for our forgetfulness. As shown in Figure 4, the agent is the active subject of experience with all his/her senses. The agent expresses and articulates his/her actions, which become interactions by being responded to by others.
Performance, situated agency, or reactions to events are perspectives of possible
observation to reﬂect from the position of the agent or from an outer position on
the different aspects of action. In this connection, previous observations and participation play an important role in our understanding the claims and goals, the
meanings and constructed truths of actions. Often, however, the cultural contexts
of action remain ambiguous because participation and observations cannot always
be constructed as a single version of reality. Even in rather conventional ﬁelds of
technology and science such a quest for unambiguous knowledge is not possible
without taking risks. There may even be blind spots that our observation cannot
control. But although action always implies precariousness, the best we can do is
to act with good reason and to critically reﬂect on our actions by relating the three
perspectives of observer, participant, and agent with each other.

Figure 4

Dewey has developed a clear understanding of the relation between participation and action. In his model of experience, action is always interwoven with reﬂection. In education the combination of action and thought is therefore essential:
“In all its activities the school will be concerned to advance its ideal of personality
through situations in which thought and action are each developed in terms of the
other. With increasing maturity its basic conception of participation . . . becomes
clariﬁed and expanded. To further this clariﬁcation and expansion the school will
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take steps, as opportunity presents itself, to enable young people to share with
their elders in enterprises which are intended to promote the common good. If
this end is to be satisfactorily achieved, however, all participation in such adult
enterprises—whether this participation be in the form of direct action or through
the imagination and the emotions—must have a reference to the progressive discovery of the discrepancies and contradictions which lie back of our present-day
social living” (LW 11, 557).
For interactive constructivism, the systematic distinction between these
three perspectives marks points in common and differences between constructivism and pragmatism. Although already in Dewey one ﬁnds anticipations of the
distinction, it is not sufﬁciently developed as a critical part of a meta-theory. Such
theory gives us clues for observing others and ourselves more systematically. It is
also a prerequisite for reﬂecting on conditions of observation. Especially for education in a democracy, the distinction is important. The change and diversity of perspectives thus envisioned is necessary in order for us to be able to relate increasing
freedom with chances of communication and participation under conditions of
solidarity (cf. Rorty 1989). With regard to the learner (student and teacher), s/he
must be seen as an active constructor of her own learning experiences (agent). In
order to learn, s/he must communicate with others in the contexts of a culture, i.e.
s/he partakes in a community of learning (participant). Observation is a necessary
condition for doing so and for reﬂecting on this doing (observer). Each of these
perspectives must provide sufﬁciently deep insights to avoid naïve and superﬁcial
perspectives in education. This calls for additional reﬂections on communication,
learning, and teaching.
If we neglected one of these perspectives, our view would suffer a lack of
differentiation. We would see ourselves as observers only, involved in neither participation nor action; we would overplay the importance of participation instead
of asking for a potential variety and diversity of observers or for more opportunities to act; we would remain in action for action’s sake, without reﬂecting upon
observations and conditions of participation that inﬂuence our actions or result
from them.
In order to consider the interrelation of the three roles more closely and more
precisely with regard to cultural contexts, I will introduce three further theoretical perspectives that are central to interactive constructivism.

Communication: Symbolic Representation,
Imagination, and Real Events
Symbolic representations (cf. Hall 1997) constitute a basic dimension of human
communication. The symbolic delimits cultural understanding and interpretation.
As Ernst Cassirer (1957) has shown in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, these forms
comprise all signs in culture, like gestures, languages, images, icons etc. Structuralist semiotics has emphasized the context of symbolic orders in any language or
structure of signs. Jacques Lacan (e.g. 2006) has elaborated a theory that suppleVolume 23 (1) ♦ 2007
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ments the symbolic with the imaginative (English translations of Lacan here often
use the term “imaginary”). No culture and its manifestations—like art, religion,
science, etc.—can do without the symbolic, yet the symbolic without the imaginative is empty. The symbolic deﬁnes the ways of dealing with imagination through
which we really learn how to register, talk about, and discuss experiences systematically. It thus helps us to specify experiences and to render emotions and impulses
comprehensible, conceivable, and communicable. In education there is always an
emphasis on the symbolic because learners have to acquire cultural knowledge and
skills. The dominance of the symbolic alone and the restriction of the symbolic to
acts of narrow reproduction of knowledge—as in the German content-oriented
school system—is an enemy of pragmatism and constructivism:
1. Symbolic learning not only refers to the acquisition of knowledge
as given, but also concerns the contexts of knowledge and knowledge construction. This implies skills of communication, inquiry,
experiment, and the appropriate habits.
2. The symbolic is never complete. There can be no list of ﬁnal subject matters. Learners always have to be open to new experiences.
And lifelong learning and teaching more and more have to provide opportunities for learning to learn.
3. The very fast-changing symbolic subject matter engenders relevant changes of cultural understanding more rapidly than in
former times. But at the same time knowledge itself has increased
extremely. Therefore the selection of content is a more and more
precarious problem. The reﬂection on the relation between participation and democratic education suggests that teachers and students must ﬁnd their own viable solutions. These solutions have
to be connected with cultural requirements and individual experiences. Thus local participation comes to the foreground as a need
for effective education and teaching.
4. The symbolic is driven by imagination and emotions. It is realized
in relationships. The imagination of individuals plays an important role in choosing contents and developing learning. Imagination as understood here is more than cognition. It stands for
desire and emotion as well. We cannot fully grasp the desire for
the imaginative through symbolic communication alone. In the
light of increasing diversity of life-worlds and lived relationships
in postmodernity, emotions and desires have to be taken into account in education more than before.
In this context it is still a challenge for pragmatists and constructivists today to look for a theoretical exchange with psychoanalysis and theories that have
been developed out of this paradigm. Even if we should not adopt psychoanalysis
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uncritically, there are some interesting developments here that can broaden our
horizons. This is especially essential in discussing the imaginative. The imaginative prevents us from being able to see others the way they “are,” independent
from our own imaginative perspective. We encounter them with desire, emotions, requests, and motives. Very often humans do not seem made for solidarity
and social coherence, focused as they are on their egocentric perspectives. Yet,
in our relationships we still depend, most of all, on our imaginations by means
of which we are connected with others, even if the connection may turn out to
be illusory. In education we need the imaginative as the desire that inspires us in
the relationships with others. It appears not only in emotional learning, but also
in those hopes and visions that guide all learning and inform it with insight and
meaning. In psychoanalysis the imaginative is a concept that among other things
reminds us of the unconscious dimensions of communication. What urges us to
do certain things? Why do these things and not others? What is it that determines
our preferences, omissions, sympathies, and antipathies? In our daydreams, many
things work that neither count nor are possible in the world. How often do we
wish to control our fellow humans’ imaginations—is not advertising the increasing evidence hereof?
Already Dewey saw that at the beginning of every learning experience there
must be an imagination of what the problem is and how the learner may respond
to it. Without this imagination, there would be no reward in learning. Teachers
must invest all necessary educative efforts in providing opportunities for a symbolic and imaginative learning so that the learners can imagine the meaning of
the experience. This is only possible if the teachers’ own imaginative desires are
alive. But Dewey discussed the combination of the symbolic and the imaginative
in a more rational and instrumental way. The critical examination of psychoanalysis or other theories that are concerned with emotions and unconscious aspects
of our being is therefore lacking in his theory. In interactive constructivism we
try to give educators and teachers a broad introduction and critical discussion of
theories that overcome this lack, such as the philosophies of Lacan, Derrida, and
Levinas. In social-cognitive theories of education like Gardner’s or Coleman’s there
is a focus on emotions and emotional learning8 more than on the unconscious.
This stands in line with the tradition founded by Dewey.9 Especially the four core
categories mentioned above (experience, context, democracy, interaction) gain a
new quality if they are reﬂected with regard to the limits of communication and
education indicated by the illusion of complete comprehension of the imaginative. Educators and teachers have to accept the limits of understanding the other
and themselves, and this tempers our view on educational communities and their
effects. Here again the point is to keep a balance between accepting the imaginative as a limit of control and at the same time building on imaginative desire as
a resource for learning.
The real, in interactive constructivism, denotes those events that show the
fundamental relativity of all imaginative and symbolic orientations in our experiVolume 23 (1) ♦ 2007
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ence. This perspective is necessary to avoid subjective exaggerations in constructivism. Even though we can only talk about these real events in the symbolic or
imagine them—by using symbolic forms like language or pictures in our imagination—the real can never be swallowed up completely in our imaginations and
symbolic articulations. Rather, it appears as that gap, disruption, or ﬁssure in between all meaning constructions, which becomes apparent, for example, in our
astonishment or speechlessness in face of the precarious side of our experiences.
It appears in the fractures of doubt or in the abundance of potential meanings implied in sense-certainty which transcend as well as delimit our imaginations and
symbolic orders of what the world “is” and how it “functions.” Yet, what appears
as real to us and how we interpret it as part of our experiences ultimately depends
on our observer positions—as self- or distant-observers. Although the real in its
immediate appearance often thwarts our imaginative and symbolic solutions, after the event we will in most cases try to deal with it imaginatively and symbolically in order to calm ourselves down. We tend to transform the insecure state
of terror, astonishment, uncertainty, and lack of knowledge or the more positive
of luck, happiness, and satisfaction into symbolic reality, which, as constructed,
states what has happened, what will turn out, and how things usually happen.
However, interactive constructivism emphasizes that each reality we construct
can be subverted by real events we cannot control. When we talk about realities,
the real is the background, which stretches into the uncertain or unconscious. Our
ﬁeld of observation is still open. If constructions of reality were all there were, we
(as human constructors) would be omnipotent. Alas, in the real world in which
we live, we often enough experience our limits. The real appears whenever our
interpretations and orientations, our explanations and ways of understanding,
our expectations and predictions, do not work out. In education, this implies
that we cannot ever completely tell whether our educative efforts will turn out
the way we hope and produce the results we desire. For educators and teachers,
the real experience often lies in the surprising or even shocking reactions they get
from their learners. One of the preconditions of becoming an educator/teacher
is precisely the ability to bear the precariousness—the contingencies and ambiguities—of learning and to resist the temptation of all too readily taking refuge
only in stable orientations.
To sum up, interactive constructivism picks up essential theoretical perspectives
from pragmatism and tries to reconstruct them for our times. The social and cultural complexity of our present situation must be taken into account in the development of educational theories. Educators and teachers must have opportunities
to gain the necessary resources for critically reﬂecting on culture, habits, visions,
and expectations. They have to realize that only by constructing their own solutions in cooperation with their learners can they do justice to the experiences and
contexts involved. In recent decades, however, there has been an increasing turn
away from theory in education worldwide. This is partly due to the theories’ grow-
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ing tendency toward specialization, neglect of social, cultural and political issues,
and detachment from practice. Therefore educators and teachers often make use
of popular advice literature and tend to ignore the more complex dimensions of
their practices. A growing number of educators and teachers, though, seem to become more and more aware of the gap between theory and practice. The impact of
interactive constructivism in German teacher education demonstrates how a large
group is interested in complex issues of theory and a more profound reﬂection of
their own experiences and practices. For them it is necessary to provide theoretical
meta-perspectives on education: the distinction of roles as observer, participant,
and agent as well as the perspectives on the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real
can be useful here. Besides these concepts, which have been in the foreground of this
essay, interactive constructivism maintains a lot of other conceptual distinctions
,like the perspectives of construction (versions of subjective reality construction),
reconstruction (in the sense of cultural reproduction) and deconstruction (critical
perspectives on omissions in versions of reality) (cf. Reich 2005, 2006).
In pragmatism, especially Deweyan pragmatism, once we have reinvented it
for our time, we still ﬁnd many resources for the proposed account of educational
visions and theses for their realization. Interactive constructivism tries to draw on
these sources and to further develop them. It tries to respond to the changed situation in our time, which is more characterized by ambivalence, ambiguity, and
lack of clarity than the time of classical pragmatism. Therefore, we have to enlarge
some views, change the direction of others, and introduce some new perspectives
on educational questions and answers. The aspects mentioned in this essay gave
a brief introduction and made some suggestions as to what directions and reconstructions may be taken into consideration.

Notes
1. An interpretation of different approaches for constructivist thought is a major
topic in Reich (1998).
2. Cf. Vygotsky (1978, 1986) and Bruner (1983, 1984, 1990, 1996), Bruner/Haste
(1987).
3. On this, cf. e.g., paradigmatically, Watzlawick (1967, 1974, 1984).
4. On this, cf. as an introduction, Hickman/Neubert/Reich (2004). Cf. also, in
particular, Garrison (1997).
5. This is partly due to bad translations.
6. For the German introductions into the approach cf. Reich (1998, 2005, 2006).
7. Cf. for other approaches e.g., Science and Education (1997), Fosnot (1996),
Lambert et al. (1995, 1996), Larochelle et al. (1998), Steffe & Gale (1995), Tobin (1993)
among many others.
8. More recent approaches in brain research show the signiﬁcance of emotions
for learning processes as well as social-cognitive psychology. Even if both approaches
differ in their reasons, they come to similar conclusions for practice.
9. Cf. Jim Garrison (1997) for the emotional in Dewey.
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